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Summary
During the LHC operation, energies up to 360 MJ will be stored in each proton beam and over
10 GJ in the main electrical circuits. With such high energies, beam losses can quickly lead to
important equipment damage. The Machine Protection Systems have been designed to provide
reliable protection of the LHC through detection of the failures leading to beam losses and fast
dumping of the beams. In order to determine the protection strategies, it is important to know
the time constants of the failure effects on the beam. In this report, we give an estimation of the
time constants of quenches and powering failures in LHC magnets. The most critical failures are
powering failures in certain normal conducting circuits, leading to relevant effects on the beam in
∼1 ms. The failures on super conducting magnets leading to fastest losses are quenches. In this
case, the effects on the beam can be significant ∼10 ms after the quench occurs.
This is an internal CERN publication and does not necessarily reflect the views of the LHC project management.
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Different phenomena such as quenches or important beam losses could lead to serious damage
in the LHC components. Therefore, protection systems have been designed to provide reliable
protection of these components while assuring maximum availability of the beam [1]. These
systems operate based on different redundant mechanisms to detect the failures or their early
effects on the beam so that the beam can be dumped safely before any damage is generated
[2].
The core of the machine protection systems is the beam interlock system, whose main
component is the beam interlock controller (BIC) [3]. The BIC is connected to other sys-
tems that will report on any failure or misfunctioning. When a failure is detected the BIC
undertakes the appropriate actions to trigger the beam dump. A detailed description of the
machine protection systems can be found in [4].
Most failures imply a decrease in the magnetic field of some magnets and the beam is
quickly affected. This mis-steered beam can lead to damage if it is not safely extracted in
time. The time between the beginning of the failure, characterized by a time-dependency
of the magnetic field, and the moment when the damage threshold is reached is a crucial
quantity to define the protection strategies of each magnet or group of magnets. Very fast
failures have to be detected before the beam is affected. Quench detectors fulfill this task at
the SC magnets [5]. In the case of warm magnets, Fast Current Change Monitors (FMCM)
may be installed for a quick detection of current decays in the coils [6].
An overview of many possible failures leading to beam losses and their time constants is
presented in [7]. However, [7] does not present a complete study of the possible failures af-
fecting each magnet, neither considers all magnets in LHC. The most critical failure scenarios
have already been treated in detail in [8]. These include powering failures and quenches in
the dipoles D1, D2, quenches in the low beta triplets (Q1, Q2, Q3) and quench scenarios in
the main dipoles in the arcs. In order to provide a complete list for the study of the machine
protection systems redundancy, this note intends to present an estimation of the relevant
time constants of failures in the powering systems of all LHC dipoles and quadrupoles.
2 Expected Failures in the Magnet Powering Systems
The relevance of possible failures for LHC operation depends on the type of magnet, the
electrical circuit configuration, the optical parameters at the location of the failing magnet
and the beam energy. In this study, we make a distinction between failures happening in
normal conducting (NC) magnets and those taking place in super conducting magnets (SC)
for two main reasons. First, quenches can only happen in SC magnets; second, the relatively
high resistance of the NC circuit implies much smaller natural time constants than for SC
magnets, leading to a faster decay of the current and hence of the magnetic field. Therefore,




A magnet quench is one of the most likely failures that would affect the beam. Therefore,
a very important part of the machine protection strategy is implemented by the Quench
Protection System (QPS) [5]. The QPS should be able to detect the quench, extract the
energy stored in the magnets and trigger the beam dump signal before any damage occurs.
The study of the quench effects on the beam is meant to give an idea of the protection
mechanisms redundancy in case that the QPS failed to detect a quench or to trigger the
beam dump in time.
For our purpose, the current decay in case of quench is modeled by a half Gaussian curve





When operating at 450 GeV, the current decay has the same shape but is orders of magnitude
slower (σ > 2 s).
2.2 Powering failures
Other possible failures may have their origin in the power converters supplying the magnets.
The power converters are voltage sources with a loop control based on a current measurement.
Therefore, if there is no failure, they act as current sources keeping the appropriate current
in the circuit.
2.2.1 Constant voltage
It may happen that the power converter sets its output voltage to a constant value. The
slope of the current ramp depends on the voltage difference between the nominal and failure
output voltages as well as on the time constant of the circuit. For this reason these powering
failures are expected to have a very slow impact on the beam when affecting SC circuits,
where very high inductances and resistances close to zero result in long time constants.
To calculate the current time dependency we assume a simple RL circuit powered by an
ideal voltage source. Before the failure the power converter supplies a voltage
Vnom = RInom (2)
This voltage is just enough to set the required current in the circuit. After the failure, the













where τ = L/R is the natural time constant of the circuit.
One possible failure with a constant output voltage from the power converter is a short
circuit in the input. In this case Vfail is set to 0 V , and the current experiences a simple
exponential decay with time constant τ . In the following, we will refer as short circuit to
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any failure of a power converter setting its output voltage to 0 V , even if this does not mean
that the input of the circuit concerned is physically shorted. The tests performed on the
power converters indicate that this is the most probable powering failure.
The other case study that has been carried out corresponds to the worst case voltage, i.e.
the possible voltage deliverable by the power converter such that Vfail − Vnom is maximum.
In the case of unipolar power converters this voltage is often equal to zero, but if the power
converter is bipolar, a maximum voltage with opposite sign can lead to a faster change of
the magnetic field.
2.2.2 Accidental ramping mode
When the protons are being accelerated from 450 GeV to 7 TeV , the current in the magnets
is increased accordingly. The main part of the ramping curve i(t) is linear and in this mode of
operation the power converters keep a constant di/dt almost until the top energy is reached.
If, by mistake, the power converter of a given circuit enters this mode of operation, the
current in the circuit will increase according to the expression




3 Failure effects on the beam
A current decay in the magnets will imply a time-varying field error. We study here the
failures on LHC dipoles and quadrupoles. The failures in multipole correctors are assumed to
have less critical consequences on the beam with larger time constants. For the calculations,
the closed orbit formulas are valid since at least tens of turns are needed to affect the beam
significantly.
3.1 Bending magnet failure
The main effect of a failure on a bending magnet or group of bending magnets is a change in










βi cos(ψ(s)− ψi + piQ) (5)
where the subindex i refers to each bending magnet affected by the failure, β and ψ are the
betatron amplitude and phase respectively and θi the kick produced by the perturbation.











where E is the energy of the particles and Bnom the magnetic field corresponding to a current
Inom in the magnet and l the magnetic length of the magnet. e and c are the charge of an
electron and the speed of light in vacuum respectively.
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For this study, we set the cosine terms to 1 assuming ψ(s) for the worst case phase
difference. In the case of a single magnet in the circuit, or magnets close to each other without
a significant betatron phase difference, we will assume simply cos(ψ(s)− ψi + piQ) = 1. For
the arc magnets, however, the phases between the different magnets in a circuit affected by










βj (cos(ψ(s)− piQ) cosψj + sin(ψ(s)− piQ) sinψj)
≤ θFi, i = 12, 23, · · · , 81
(7)
Powering failures may affect various magnets if they are part of the same circuit. In
this case the error θi = θ is the same for all magnets in the circuit, since they all have the
same characteristics and are powered in series. The factors Fi maximize the term above in
function of s and have been calculated for each arc in the LHC. Combining (5), (6) and (7)















For independently powered magnets Fi is equal to
√
βi.
3.2 Focusing magnet failure
If the failure affects a quadrupole magnet, the beam will suffer two main effects: beta
beating and tune shift. In this study we restrict ourselves to the consequences of the beta
beating. However, both tune shift and beta beating contribute together to the beam losses
and computer simulations have to be used to better consider this case. Similar reasonings















βj cos(ψ(s)− ψj + piQ) (10)
where i stands for each magnet in the same circuit. Here, for individually powered magnets,
Fi = βi.
If the beam has a transversal offset at the quadrupole location the quadrupole has also
a bending effect on the beam. This case can be considered in a first order approximation as
a dipole failure where the equations 5 and 6 apply, with B0 equal to the magnetic field at
the transversal beam position with respect to the axis of the quadrupole.
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4 Evaluation of the effect on the beam
In order to define a comparison criterion for the relevance and speed of failures in magnets
of different types, we evaluate the time needed to displace or enlarge the transversal beam
distribution until a given part of it is beyond the collimators aperture. This comparison
criterion is shown in figure 1. The hatched areas correspond to a number of particles N
beyond aperture and define ∆x and ∆β/β that produce comparable losses. Note that N
would correspond to single turn losses. In the case of multiturn losses, a smaller beam offset
is required to lose the same number of particles. For example, to lose N = 1.15 1011 in
a single turn a transversal beam displacement of 2.6σ is required, while an offset of 1.9σ
would be enough to lose the same number of particles over many turns. In the failure cases
presented in this note, the beam is not lost in a single turn, but it is not stable either. The
loss scenarios considered are between these two extreme cases.
The aperture has been set to 6σ from the closed orbit, corresponding to a primary
collimator (σ represents the transversal standard deviation of the beam particle distribution).























where F−1(p;µ, σ) represents the inverse cumulative normal distribution for a probability p,
with a mean value µ and a standard deviation σ.
For this study, it has been assumed that the beam hits first the primary collimator with
the highest β function. To determine which collimator will be hit first for each failing magnet
simulation software has to be used.
The number of particles beyond aperture is related to the losses and their damage po-
tential, but does not represent them in a realistic way. The energy of the particles and the
localization of the energy deposition have to be taken into account to ascertain the damage
potential of beam losses. More detailed studies will be carried out to evaluate precisely the
time between the beginning of the failure and the instant when the actual damage threshold
is reached.
5 Results
In this section we present the numerical results from the application of the formulas above
to the LHC dipoles and quadrupoles. The beam distribution is considered Gaussian and
the maximum power converter voltage is assumed to be 10% larger than the peak voltage,
which is consistent with the hardware limitation set at the power converters. In terms of
optical parameters, the worst phase differences and maximum beta in a primary collimator
have been used. This is a worst case scenario that is certainly too pessimistic in most
















Figure 1: The Gaussian curves represent the particle transversal distributions. The number of
particles beyond the collimator aperture (blue vertical lines) are used to compare the effects of
failures in bending magnets and quadrupoles. The image on the left represents the effect of a
failure in a bending magnet. On the right the beta-beating effect of a failure in a quadrupole
magnet is shown
estimation. The number of particles beyond aperture that has been used for the calculations
is N = 1.15 1011. It corresponds to the number of particles in a single bunch and, even if it
does not represent accurately a physical threshold in terms of damage, it is assumed to give
a meaningful idea of the speed of the effects of failures on the beam. In the following, the
time leading to 1.15 1011 particles beyond aperture will be referred to as tN .
The numerical results for times greater or equal than 10 ms are given with a precision of
1 ms, which is enough for the purpose of our study. More precision is given for times under
10 ms, but the assumptions that have been made are quite coarse and this higher precision
may not be very meaningful.
5.1 Bending magnets
To evaluate the effect of a failure on a bending magnet circuit we have also estimated the
time it takes for the beam to move by 6σ. A deviation of 6σ at a primary collimator position
implies the axis of the beam hitting the collimator. The combination of (1), (3), (4) and (8)
yields the equations shown in table 1 for the calculation of the relevant times.
The corresponding numerical results are listed in tables 2 and 3 for 450 GeV and 7 TeV.
The natural time constant of the circuits is also given.
In the case of SC dipoles only the relevant failures are presented. Most powering failures
result in slow current decays and do not produce fast beam deflections. Only a powering
failure with maximum voltage difference at 450 GeV would result in times below 100 ms in
some magnets, while in the rest of the cases these times are at least two orders of magnitude
greater. The time constants for the beam distortions produced by relevant failure cases of
SC magnets is shown in table 4. For the arc bending magnets, the quench of a single magnet
is considered while the powering failure affects all the magnets in the circuit.
It is interesting to note that in spite of the large time constant, a powering failure that
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Table 1: Equations for the calculation of relevant times related to a bending magnet failure. For




Short circuit Constant di/dt ∆Vmax
Magnet τ t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN
[s] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
MBXW 2.038 80 35 926 407 3.2 1.4
MBW(IR3) 3.273 85 37 528 232 2.5 1.1
MBW(IR7) 2.815 110 48 792 348 2.5 1.1
MCBWH 0.420 328 114 3737 1641 7.7 3.4
MCBWV 0.423 321 113 3665 1610 7.6 3.3
MBAW 9.901 NR > 104 > 104 > 104 687 296
MBWMD 3.065 NR 2426 > 104 > 104 201 74
MBXWT 1.088 > 104 629 7120 3127 18 7.9
MBLW 10.400 > 104 5480 > 104 9560 426 185
MBXWH 1.764 NR 1584 > 104 > 104 47 21
MBXWS 0.651 NR NR > 104 > 104 30 13
Table 2: Minimum estimated times for beam effects of different failures on NC bending magnets
at 450 GeV. NR indicates that the considered effect is not reached. The calculations were done for
beam 1 with the optical parameters of LHC v6.5
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Short circuit Constant di/dt ∆Vmax
Magnet τ t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN
[s] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
MBXW 2.038 3.9 1.7 708 311 3.9 1.7
MBW(IR3) 3.273 25 9.3 2081 914 25 9.3
MBW(IR7) 2.815 27 12 3122 1371 15 6.5
MCBWH 0.420 62 26 > 104 6473 21 9.0
MCBWV 0.423 61 26 > 104 6349 20 8.8
MBAW 9.901 1547 650 > 104 > 104 532 230
MBWMD 3.065 331 141 > 104 > 104 390 141
MBXWT 1.088 70 30 6937 3047 27 10
MBLW 10.400 1567 660 > 104 > 104 617 266
MBXWH 1.764 657 259 > 104 > 104 135 58
MBXWS 0.651 201 81 > 104 > 104 35 15
Table 3: Minimum estimated times for beam effects of different considered failures on NC bending
magnets at 7 TeV. The calculations were done for beam 1 with the optical parameters of LHC v6.4
∆Vmax 450 GeV Quench at 7 TeV
Magnet τ t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN
[s] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
MB (3-4) 13560 110 48 16 10
MBRB 82.30 60 26 24 16
MBRS 75.22 83 38 28 19
MBRC 53.42 94 41 16 10
MBX 43.14 44 19 13 8.6
MCBH/V 85.40 1830 791 132 84
MCBCH/V 47.33 643 282 85 56
MCBXH 42.33 700 306 63 41
MCBXV 25.83 412 180 62 41
MCBYH/V 83.65 794 348 58 38
Table 4: Minimum estimated times for beam effects of most critical failures on SC bending magnets.
The calculations were done with the optical parameters of LHC beam 1, v6.5 for 450 GeV and v6.4
for 7 TeV
8






























Table 5: Equations for the calculation of relevant times related to a quadrupole magnet failure.
For magnet grouped nearby without a significant betatron phase difference, Fi = βi
sets a maximum voltage difference at 450 GeV can lead to a fast beam deflection. It can
also be seen that quenches at 7 TeV produce very fast losses too.
5.2 Focusing magnets
A magnetic field perturbation in the quadrupoles results in tune shift and beta beating. For
our purpose, the beta beating is considered to estimate the effect on the beam and provide a
comparison criterion with dipoles. The formulas used for the calculations are listed in table
5.
The numerical values corresponding to the relevant times for beam effects due to failures
in the NC magnets powering are listed in tables 6 and 7 for injection and nominal collision
optics.
Table 8 shows the times for beam deflections when a powering failure affects a NC
quadrupole that is not perfectly aligned with the beam. An offset of 1 mm between the
beam axis and the quadrupole axis has been supposed.
The SC quadrupoles are the least critical of the magnets considered in this study. Only
four magnets would loose the considered number of particles in less than 100 ms in case of
quench, and only at 7 TeV. The beam effect time estimations for the worst failure cases are
listed in table 9 for the most relevant SC quadrupoles. The rest of the quadrupoles are not
listed in these tables: for these magnets, the considered effects happen after one second in
the worst situation, and in most of the cases well after five seconds.
Table 10 shows the fastest times for beam deflections when a powering failure affects a
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Short circuit Constant di/dt ∆Vmax
Magnet τ tN tN tN
[s] [ms] [ms] [ms]
MQWA 0.6681 350 11 11
MQWB 0.7015 NR 59 59
Table 6: Minimum estimated times for beam effects of different failures on NC quadrupoles at
450 GeV. NR indicates that the considered effect is not reached. The calculations were done for
beam 1 with the optical parameters of LHC v6.5
Short circuit Constant di/dt ∆Vmax
Magnet τ tN tN tN
[s] [ms] [ms] [ms]
MQWA 0.6681 340 126 341
MQWB 0.7015 NR 1290 1290
Table 7: Minimum estimated times for beam effects of different failures on NC quadrupoles at
7 TeV. NR indicates that the considered effect is not reached. The calculations were done for beam
1 with the optical parameters of LHC v6.4
Injection Collision
Short circuit ∆Vmax Short circuit ∆Vmax
Magnet t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN
[ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
MQWA NR 554 34 15 284 110 284 110
MQWB NR NR 307 119 NR NR 2519 391
Table 8: Minimum estimated times for fastest beam deflections due to a failure affecting misaligned
NC quadrupoles. A misalignment of 1 mm offset has been supposed. For injection optics LHC v6.5
has been used. Nominal collision optics correspond to LHC v6.4
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Injection Collision
Magnet τ tN∆ Vmax tN∆ Vmax tN quench
[s] [ms] [ms] [ms]
MQ 260.6 420 7046 184
MQM 49.4 993 > 104 317
MQMC 54.1 1356 > 104 NR
MQML 39.4 248 2061 93
MQY 68.5 1458 4041 83
MQXA 20.1 208 105
MQXB 55.5 599 507
MQXA/B 426.6 1052 1343 21
Table 9: Minimum estimated times for beam effects of different considered failures on super-
conducting quadrupoles. The last row corresponds to a failure on both MQXA and MQXB. In-
dependent quenches on MQXA and MQXB are not considered because the the quench protection
system induces a current decay in both MQXA and MQXB at the same time. The calculations
were done for beam 1 with the optical parameters of LHC v6.5 for 450 GeV and v6.4 for 7 TeV
SC quadrupole that has an offset of 1 mm between the beam axis and the quadrupole axis.
In the case of the inner triplets (MQXA, MQXB) the offset is 4 mm, due to the crossing
angles. The failures that are not listed in this table produce slow beam deflections (time to
reach ∆x = 6σ greater than one second).
6 Conclusions
The study that we have carried out is useful to estimate the relative relevance of different
magnet failures. As expected, the fastest effects happen in the case of quenches and powering
failures affecting the NC magnets. Table 11 lists the 10 most critical magnets at 450 GeV
and 7 TeV.
The fastest effects happen at 450 GeV. This is due to the larger beam section and higher
possible voltage differences. However, losses at 7 TeV are much more dangerous since the
particles are significantly more energetic. Therefore, the time until some damage on the
accelerator hardware happen may be shorter at 7 TeV.
The type of failure leading to the fastest effects is a maximum voltage set by mistake by
the power converter in the case of the NC magnets and a quench in the case of the SC ones.
The most critical magnets are the NC dipoles MBW (D3, D4 in IR3 and IR7) and MBXW
(D1 in IR1 and IR5). The fast effects on these magnets were already expected and are in
accordance with previous results. From this evaluation, we have found out that the MBXWT
(orbit compensator for ALICE) is also quite critical and that failures in the NC correctors
MCBWH and MCBWV could lead to fast losses at 450 GeV. However, the conditions leading
to critical failures in these NC corrector magnets are very unlikely. As expected, powering
failures of the superconducting magnets produce slow losses, and only quenches are relevant.
Particularly, quenches in SC bending magnets and at the inner triplet quadrupoles have




Magnet t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN t for 6σ tN
[ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms] [ms]
MQ 1702 746 7875 3430 243 144
MQM 1393 607 8670 3622 158 100
MQMC 3637 1568 > 104 8501 360 186
MQML 1004 438 3502 1500 123 79
MQY 4946 2128 > 104 5058 135 87
MQXA/B† 3132 1373 4425 1938 19 12
MQXA† 445 194 287 125
MQXB† 825 361 915 400
MQTLH 720 312 2221 931 224 135
MQS 2667 1126 9899 3735 NR 347
Table 10: Minimum estimated times for fastest beam deflections due to a failure affecting SC
quadrupoles. A misalignment of 1 mm offset has been supposed. The magnet names marked with †
correspond to the inner triplets. In this case the offset has been set to 4 mm, which is more realistic.
Independent quenches on MQXA and MQXB are not considered because the the quench protection
system induces a current decay in both MQXA and MQXB at the same time. For injection optics
LHC v6.5 has been used. Nominal collision optics correspond to LHC v6.4
Injection Collision
Magnet tN [ms] Failure Magnet tN [ms] Failure
MBW 1.1 ∆Vmax MBXW 1.7 ∆Vmax
MBXW 1.4 ∆Vmax MBW 6.5 ∆Vmax
MCBWH/V 3.2 ∆Vmax MBX 8.6 Quench
MBXWT 7.9 ∆Vmax MCBWH/V 9.0 ∆Vmax
MQWA 11 ∆Vmax MBXWT 10 ∆Vmax
MBXWS 13 ∆Vmax MB 10 Quench
MBX 18 ∆Vmax MBRC 10 Quench
MBXWH 21 ∆Vmax MQXA/B 12 Quench (4mm offset)
MB 21 Quench MBXWS 15 ∆Vmax
MBRB 32 Quench MBRB 16 Quench
Table 11: Top ten critical magnets and failures at 450 GeV and 7 TeV.
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detection should be set accordingly.
The results presented in this note have been used to identify the need of FMCMs on
the warm LHC magnets. In addition, they will set a reference to perform further studies
involving simulation software to precisely determine the time between the beginning of a
failure and the moment when the damage threshold is reached. It is important to note that
for quadrupole failures the values obtained hereby provide only comparative criteria. In
order to ascertain realistic time values for their effect on the beam, tracking simulations are
essential.
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